This chapter describes the whereabouts and actions of Taiwanese military and political authorities in the 228 Massacre and investigates their due responsibilities. The chapter breaks into five sections, describes in detail the roles of Taiwan Provincial Executive Office and commander-in-chief of Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command Chen Yi, the chief of Staff of Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command Ke Yuan-Fen, commandant of Kaohsiung fortress Peng Meng-Ci, and other military-political personnel, intelligent and security agents.
The Nationalist government’s bad political habits and the power struggles among KMT factions were carried over to Taiwan when it took over Taiwan after the war. In view of this however, Chen Yi, then the highest political and military leader in Taiwan, remained oblivious to the problems. He used wrong persons for office positions, and turned a blind eye on his subordinates’ corruptions and bad military discipline. All the improper policies led to employment discrimination, economic exploitation, and social turbulence. Before the 228 Massacre, Chen Yi's mal-administration had already led Taiwan people to much disappointment with the performance of the Nationalist government, even a Shanghai media had already predicted at the time that “in Taiwan, a turmoil is on verge of breaking out.”
Studies of numerous disclosed historical data and narrated histories suggest that after the Massacre took place, Chen Yi, who did not have enough troops to control the situation at the time, resorted to lies, and pretended to make concession with the public. Chen Yi harbored ill-will from the beginning and was insincere when faced with Taiwan people’s appeal for political reform. He played two-handed tricks that on the surface, he pretended to make concessions, but then turned around and asked for dispatch of troops to Taiwan. Once he confirmed the troops would be dispatched, he dramatically changed his attitude and broke his previous promises with the Taiwan people. Worse even, he framed and cooked up charges to justify the dispatch of troops and shirked responsibility for his mal-administration in Taiwan. Crafty scheme of such evil conduct was exactly the epitome of modern Chinese’ practice in office, which should be strongly condemned.
Ke Yuan-Fen, chief of Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command, was preconceived with the idea that it was the Communist Party that pulled the strings behind the Massacre. He set up traps and used local gentry to segregate people; he recruited gangsters, intelligent and security agents to produce “armed uprising” and exaggerated the event. He, on the one hand, bluffed his prophetic vision, and on the other hand, shirked his responsibility. After the national army reinforced, Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command spearheaded the arresting and killing of Taiwanese elites; they also took the opportunity to engage in extortion and blackmailing that investigator Yang Liang-Gong, whom was assigned to come to Taiwan to investigate, called them “lawless killers who do all evils.”
Commandant of Kaohsiung fortress Peng Meng-Ci also was preconceived with the idea that the March 2 Massacre in Kaohsiung was a “conspiratorial activity” plotted by the Communist Party. He objected to resolving it peacefully but tackled the matter with “military crackdown.” With sweet talks, Peng Meng-Ci pretended he wanted to negotiate and lured local leader to Shoushan on March 5. He then launched a military operation on March 6, massacred innocent people. Peng Meng- Ci was promoted as the highest military leader of Taiwan because he “put down a rebellion voluntarily” in the 228 Massacre, and enjoyed a successful career throughout his life. However, with the general public, he had gained an infamous reputation as “the Kaohsiung butcher” for his crude suppression and bloody slaughter of the innocents.
As for other military and political personnel, the fourth regimental commander of Military Police Chang Mu-Tao helped Ke Yuan-Fen by using gentries to segregate members of the “228 Massacre Handling Committee,” and lied openly several times to tune down people’s alert. After the nationalist army arrived in Taiwan, the fourth regiment of Military Police took part in arresting people, with disregard for law and discipline. Their excessive abuse of power in arresting people had caused great fear among the people in the general public. They even competed with the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command for merit and fought for power. Keelung fortress commandant Shih Hong-Si connived military personnel at the fortress to retaliate against and massacre un-armed peasants with crude methods. The situation was second only to Kaohsiung. Shih Hong-Si himself and his nephew Shih Guo-Hua were accused of making use of the 228 Massacre to kill and retaliate against innocents.The military under the command of Commander of 21st military division Liou Yu-Cing engaged in rampant killings and vented their hatred by committing horrible slaughter that was also rarely seen in the Taiwan history. And all over the places, military and political personnel in charge of the “pacification” and “purge” were accomplices of the terror regime. What they did severely infringed upon people’s basic human rights. Military, political officers and Mainlander civil servants in all places seized the opportunity to extort, loot, kill and press false charges against people. All of which had forced the restructured Taiwan Provincial Government to send cables and ordered all local governments should by all means prohibit and suppress the aforementioned crimes.
Intelligent and security agents also played active roles in the 228 Massacre. In the early years after the war, organizations such as the Garrison Command’s investigation office, Ministry of National Defense’s Counterespionage Bureau (reorganized from the Military Commission Investigation and Statistic Bureau after May, 1946), the Kuomintang Central Committee’s Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, and military police regiments employed investigators and stool pigeon to monitor every social movement in Taiwan. According to a recent unearthed Syu De- Huei to Mao Ren-Fong—work report on sowing distrust among enemies in the 228 Massacre, and other relevant historical data, Ministry of National Defense’s Counterespionage Bureau commanded Syu De-Huei to organize 250 gangster in Taipei area during the Massacre and formed a peacekeeping team called “Jhong Yi Service Team.” On the surface, they pretended they were keeping the public in order, but in reality, they ran wild, incited disturbance, batter Mainlanders,burnt Mainlanders’ shops so to cook up excuse for the central government to dispatch troops to Taiwan. Meanwhile, they urged innocent young students to participate in these events and then made them the scapegoats. Personnel from all intelligent and security systems each had his axe to grind. For examples, they would send telegraphs to the central government and exaggerate the situation in Taiwan; they would stir up others with sensational comments in order to attack and undermine public’s reliance of the Chen Yi government. Personnel from all intelligent and security systems also exaggerated the situation of the 228 Massacre with an aim to emphasize the Mainlander’s level of damage and injury. They also made believe that it was the Communist Party that pulled the strings behind the scenes and that there were tens of thousands of Communists involved. They further insisted that the Massacre was not just about people’s appeal for political reform but act of power struggling and treason. They did what they did because 1) they wanted to attack Chen Yi’s authority and prestige by suggesting that Chen Yi had lost control of the situation in Taiwan, 2) they wanted to shirk their responsibilities for unable to calm the situation in Taiwan, and 3) they wanted to seek excuses for their request to call for reinforcements and to solve the situation in Taiwan with military crackdown. All these sensational stories reported to the supreme authorities of Nanjing undoubtedly strengthened its determination to dispatch troops and carry out the crackdown.
On April 1947, Ministry of National Defense’s Counterespionage Bureau submitted a “228 Rebellion List” in which it divided Taiwan into areas such as Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtong, Hualian, etc. and enumerated over one thousand “traitors,” including their names,gender, age, place of birth, former post, the roles they played in the “treason,” charge and address. Lin Sian-Tang, who harbored a moderate stance in the 228 Massacre, was listed first on the “traitors” list. Others included Lee Wan-Jyu, Lian Jhen-Dong, and Huang Guo-Shu. The scope of which was dreadful that nearly any well-known Taiwanese figures were unable to spare from the misfortune.
(Chen Tsui-Lien is an associate professor at the Institute of Taiwan History, National Chengchi University)