TThe Sino-Japanese war was over in 1945. When the National government moved back to Nanjing from Chongcing in May, 1946, the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the Northeast had already been like a raging fire. One of the reasons of the civil war was the challenge of legitimacy faced by the Nanjing government. The Kuomintang then, managed with an effort, passed the Constitution of the Republic of China on December 25 of the same year, promulgated it on January 1, 1947 and implemented it on December 25. The 228 Massacre happened at the period of time between end of the political tutelage stage and the beginning of constitutional ruling. Under the influence of Kuomintang founder Sun Yat-Sen’s “five yuan constitutional theory,” the political tutelage stage then had already had an agency functioned like the Control Yuan that corrected and impeached officials of all ranks. Control Yuan member Yang Liang-Gong, who visited and inspected Taiwan as the inspector general of Fuchien and Taiwan, had reported back to the Nanjing government the corrupted administration in Taiwan. The Supreme National Defense Council had also appointed Liou Wun-Dao, head of the “Investigation Group,” to Taiwan for a field inspection. However Chiang Kai-Shek, placed a strong trust in Chen Yi, did not sway. Even after the 228 Massacre erupted and that the 3rd Plenary Session of the Kuomintang’s 6th Central Executive Committee in Nanjing passed a petition introduced by Liou Wun-Dao and other 55 people on March 22 to have Chen Yi removed from office and receive due disciplinary action, Chiang Kai-Shek chose to veto the resolution in accordance with president's privilege.
On March 7, the “228 Massacre Handling Committee” proposed 32 (some says 42) requests and fingered “the whole Taiwan government should shoulder all responsibility.” Taiwanese in Shanghai at the time also singled out Chen Yi as “the chief culprit of the tragic massacre.” It was obvious that, given the situation at the time, Taiwanese representatives only hoped that the government of Nanjing could come and solve the problems, without thinking that it should shoulder the responsibility. They expected Minister of National Defense Bai Chong- Si to pacify and console the people. But soon after Bai’s arrival in Taiwan on March 17, he edged toward Chen Yi's stance. It was inconceivable that in the award list he proposed, it even included commandant of Kaohsiung fortress Peng Meng-Ci and commandant of Keelung fortress Shih Hong-Si, whom committed innumerable murders in the Massacre. If ones are to compare them with Chen Cheng, a top military aide at that time, Chen Cheng at least noticed that only the article 14 (not 9) of the martial law was applicable to the situation in Taiwan, and that non-soldiers should not be tried by court-martial. This suggested that a ranking official’s level of understanding of the concept of human rights could influence level of severity of the Massacre’s outcome; hence, people should not be treated the same when probing their due responsibility.
We think that Chiang Kai-Shek, president of the Nationalist government, should bear the biggest responsibility for the 228 Massacre. Reasons being that he not only was oblivious to warning cautioned by the Control Yuan prior to the Massacre, he was also partial to Chen Yi afterward. None of the provincial military and political officials in Taiwan were punished because of the Massacre. Further more, he deployed forces right after the Massacre, as written in a letter by Chen Yi to Chiang Kai-Shek dated March 13: “If not for Your Excellency to mobilize troop rapidly, one could not imagine how far this massacre will lead to.” Chiang Kai-Shek, despite all information he gathered from the party, government, army, intelligence, and representative of Taiwanese groups, still chose to send troops right away; he summoned commander of the 21st division Liu Yu-Cing and gave him 600 pistols simultaneously, all of which deteriorated the situation.
A file code-named Dasi Archive that contained information relating to the 228 Massacre had collected 99 documents from the period between February 10 , 1947 and June 4, 1948. All of them were letters and cables between Chiang Kai-Shek, Chen Yi, Ye Siou-Fong, Liou Yu-Cing, Chen Cheng, Bai Chong-Si, Guei Yong-Cing, Ho Han-Wun, Wei Dao-Ming, Peng Meng- Ci, Wu Ding-Chang, Yu You-Ren, Sie Guan-Sheng, Ministry of National Defense’s Counterespionage Bureau, the Kuomintang Central Committee’s Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Kuomintang, government and military personnel, even that of judicial and Control Yuan members. This suggested that Chiang Kai-Shek was deeply involved in the Massacre in all levels. Such a top leader certainly should bear the biggest responsibility for the Massacre.
Looking back from February, 2005, we can not help but pay special attention to a letter by Chen Yi to Chiang Kai-Shek dated March 6 , 1947. It asked him to send army to Taiwan on the reason that: “Keep Taiwan as the territory of the Republic of China.” Chen Yi, having governed Taiwan for more than one year, must have sensed the difficulties in connecting Taiwan and China politically, economically, socially, and/or academically. But he made great concessions to the Kuomintang government’s trend of thought and behavioral pattern that eventually led to the tragedy---mistake of which still has consequential influence in Taiwan to-day.
(Chen Yi-Shen is an assistant researcher at the Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History and a board member of the Memorial Foundation of 228)